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STATE OF NEW Y O N  
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of FRANK HEID, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Petitioner, 
Respondent , 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RTI # 0142-ST3269 Index No. 7332-1 1 
Appearances : Frank Heid 
Inmate No. 86-B-2239 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Cayuga Correctional Facility 
PO Box 11 86 
Moravia, Mew York 13 1 18- 1 186 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Cathy Y. Sheehan, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DEClSIONlORDEWJUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Cayuga Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination ofrespondent dated January 25,201 1 
to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a controlling term of 
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19 years to life upon st conviction of murder in the second degree. The petitioner attributes 
his crime, committed when he was age 20, to being ’’extremely intoxicated, under the 
influence of a variety of drugs, suffer[ing] from cognitive deficits and low self-esteem as a 
result of a dysfunctional childhood.” He points out that he received st General Equivalency 
Diploma on August 17, 1987, an Associates of Science Degree from Ulster Community 
College in May 1992, and a Bachelor’s of Arts Degree from S.U.N.Y. New Paltz. He has 
applied for entry into the Masters Degree Program ax Syracuse University. Other 
accomplishments include being certified as iltl Inmate Program Assistant. His prison 
employment has included maintenance stores clerk, carpenter, plumber MP-2 computer 
operator, snow plow operator, general mechanic and domr porter. He is a Peer Counselor 
with the Office of Transitional Services. The petitioner has completed a number of programs, 
including Aggression Replacement Training, Non- violent Conflict Resolution, Alcohol and 
Substance Abuse, Sex Offender Program. He indicates  at he has worked closely with 
family members and others to prepare for his re-entry into society. 
The petitioner criticizes the Parole Board for failing to consider his educational, 
programing and employment accomplishments while incarcerated. He points out that this 
was his fourth. appearance before the Parole Board. A major argument advanced by the 
petitioner is that the Parole Board failed to review his case pursuant to the 201 1 amendmenb 
to Executive Law §§ 259-i and 259-c. He maintains that the Parole Board determination was 
not based upon a thorough evaluation of the statutory criteria, and was made in violation of 
Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A). He faults the Parole Hoard for not instructing him of how 
he could qualify for release in the future. 
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The petitioner points out that the Parole Board received no statement from any party 
opposing his release. In his view the Parole Board placed unjustifiable reliance upon the 
severity of petitioner’s crime, to the exclusion of all other factors; and contends that it 
violated a presumption in favor of release for parole reappearances. The petitioner also 
maintains that the twenty-four month hold was excessive and irrational. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Denied - Hold for 24 months, Next appearance date: I212012 
“This Panel has concluded that your release to supervision is not 
compatible with the welfare of society and therefore parole is 
denied . 
“This finding is made following a personal interview, record 
review and deliberation. Of significant concern is the extremely 
violent and deviant nature of the instant offense of murder 2nd 
where you raped, mutilated and viciously stabbed an 85-year-old 
woman causing her death. Positive factors considered included 
your program accomplishments, community support and 
improved behavior since October 2006. In addition, your instant 
offense occurred after you had consumed h g s  and alcohol. 
Your receipt of more than 2 dozen disciplinary violations 
including for drug actions is disturbing. To grant your release 
at this time would so deprecate the seriousness of your offense 
as to undermine respect for the law. 
“The probability you wiIl live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law is not found to be reasonable given the factors 
noted above.” 
As relevant here, the 20 1 1  legislation (see L 201 1 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 5 38-b, 
el‘ seq.) amended the Executive Law, as it relates to parole determinations in two ways. First, 
Executive Law 5 259-c was revised to abolish the old guideline criteria, and establish a 
review process that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates 
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have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-free if 
released. Said section now recites: “[tlhe state board of parole shall [I (4) establish written 
procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. Such written procedures 
shdl incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation ofpersons appearing 
before the board, the Iikelihood of success of suck persons upon retease, and assist members 
of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole 
supervision” (L 20 I 1 ch 62, Part C ,  Subpart A, 8 38-b). This amendment was made effective 
six months after its adoption on March 3 1,20 1 1 that is, on October 1,20 1 1 (see L 20 1 1, ch 
62, Pari C, Subpart A, 9 49-[fJ). In the second change, Executive 2594 (2) (c )  was amended 
to incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to consider in 
making release determinations (see L 201 I ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, Q 28-f-1). This 
amendment was effective immediately upon its adoption on March 3 1, 20 I 1 (see L 20 I 1, 
ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 6 49). However, the latter amendment did not result in a substantive 
change in the criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its decision. 
With regard to the issue of retroactivity of the 20 1 1 legislation, as noted, the parole 
determination here was made on January 25,20 1 1, well before the legislation was enacted, 
and well before the effective date of the amendment to Executive Law 25% (4). Generally 
speaking, statutory amendments ‘‘ are presumed to have prospective appfication unless the 
Legislature‘s preference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated” (Matter of 
Gieason v Michael Vee Ltd., 96 NY2d 117, 122 [2001 J,  citing People v Oliver, I NY2d 
152, 157). While remedial Iegislation often will be appIied retroactively to carry OUT its 
beneficial purpose, this is not: the case where the Legislature “has made a specific 
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pronouncement about retroactive effect” (see Matter of Gleason v Michael Vee Ltd,, suDra, 
at 122). In this instance, as the Court observed in Matter of Hamilton v New York State 
Division of ParoIe (943 NYS2d 73 1, Platkin, Richard M.,Sup. Ct., AIbany Co., 20 121, “the 
State Legislature considered the question of the effectiveness of the 20 1 1 Amendments and 
determined that the new procedures contemplated by the amendments to Executive Law 6 
259-c (4) should not be given effect with respect to administrative proceedings conducted 
prior to October 1 ? 20 1 1 .“ This Court agrees. Under such circumstances, there clearly was 
no Legislative intent that said amendments be applied retroactively to parole determinations 
rendered prior to October 1, 20 I 1 (see id.). 
While the appeals decision of the parole determination was rendered on November 
3, 201 1, the Court is of the view that inasmuch as the new procedures required under 
Executive Law § 259-c (4) did not exist as of the January 25,20 1 1 parole determination, the 
Appeals Unit did not err in reviewing the parole appeal under the administrative procedures 
which existed on that date. Phrased differently, the Appeals Unit could not rationally find 
that the Parole Board erred as a matter of law in not following an administrative procedure 
not yet adopted by the respondent, pursuant to legislation not yet enacted. 
Turning now to the merits of the instant petition, parole release decisions are 
discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory requirements,not reviewable (Matter of De 
La Cmz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 20041; Matter of Collado v New York State 
Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., ZOOl]). Furthermore, only a “showing of 
irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to 
necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000], 
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quoting +Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801; see also 
Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,1369 [3d Dept., 20 1 11). In the absence oftke 
above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made by the 
Parole Board (E Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 
[3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to the 
following matters: petitioner's educational accompiishments; letters written on his behalf; 
his support network of family and friends; his improved disciplinary record; and his plans 
upon release including residing with his Aunt, and anticipated future employment. The 
decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of 
parole and it satisfiedthe requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 
NY3d 773 120081; Matter of Whitehead v. RUSS~, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter 
of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is 
proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness ofthe inmate's 
crimes and their violent nature @ Matter of Matos v New York State Board of Parole, 87 
AD3d 1193 [3d Dept., 201 11; Matter ofDudley v Travis, 227 hD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), 
as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd 
Dept.? 19971; Matter of Cohen v GonzaIez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole 
Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in 
determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Matos 
6 
[* 6]
v New York State Board of Parole, supra; Matter o€Young v New York Division of Parole, 
74 AD3d 168 I., 168 1- 3 682 [3d Dept., 20 IO]; Matter of Wise v New York State Division of 
Parole, 54 AD3d463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory 
language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 9 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of 
Silver0 v Dennison, 28 RD3d 859 [3rd Dept., ZOOS]). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate 
the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the 
circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s 
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the 
individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her 
‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate 
the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] Iaw”’ (Matter of Durio v New 
York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 200.11, quoting Executive Law $2594 
[2] [c] [A], other citations omitted). 
Petitioner’s argument that the ParoIe Board is required to advise petitioner andor 
provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabibthe efforts he 
should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit 
(- see Executive Law 6 259-i [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR 5 8002.3; Matter ofFrancis vNew York State 
DivisionofParole,89AD3d 1312,1313 [3dDept.,201~]1;Boothev~ammock,605F2d661 
[2nd Cir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 2 1 AD3d 1 I74 
[3rd Dept., 20051). 
Lastly, the Parole Board‘s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta 
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v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 13rd Bept., 20021, Iv denied 98 
NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is seaiing all records submitted for in cnmera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decisiodorderljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. AI1 other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County CIerk for filing. The signing of this 
decisiodorderljudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicabk 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry arid notice of entry 
ENTER 
Dated: June /3-,2012 1 
Troy, New York 
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/y- p George B. Ceresia, Jr. 







Order To Show Cause dated December 12,20 1 1, Petition, Supporting 
Papers and Exhibits 
Petitioner’s Addendum dated January I2,20 I2 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of FRANK HEID, 
Petitioner. 
-against- 
NEW Y O K  STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
MI # 01-12-ST3269 Index No. 7332-1 1 I 1  
SEALING ORDER 
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in 
cumera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent's Exhibit B, 
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent's Exhibit D, Confidential Portion of Inmate 
Status Report, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the foregoing designated docummtts, including all dcplicates and 
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or 
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court. 
ENTER 
Dated: June /$, 2012 
Troy, New York George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
- -F-   
Supreme Court Justice 
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